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Abstract
This note presents a new result on incomplete contracts. We show that if the different degrees
of relation−specificity of the partnerts’ investments determines their ex post bargaining
position (what Williamson (1985) calls “the fundamental transformation”), it will appear a
potential coordination failure. Under plausible conditions, the parties will coordinate in the
more inefficient but less risky equilibrium, that is, in the risk−dominant equilibrium in the
sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
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1. Introduction
Previous literature on the hold up problem (see, for instance, Grossman and Hart
(1986), Hanson (1995), Hart (1995), Hart and Moore (1990)) takes always the degree of
relation-specificity of the investments as given, focussing on the  level of ex ante
investments and comparing it with the first best solution under complete contracting.
Moreover, this literature considers that the parties’ bargaining position (for example, the
status quo point in the Nash solution or the outside options in an alternating offers
negotiation) depends on the ownership structure. Namely, a player’s bargaining position
improves with the property of the assets. Therefore, this literature identifies actually
property rights with bargaining power.
By contrast, this note analyses a new aspect of the hold up problem under
decentralized property. Many times, the relevant issue is not the level of ex ante
investment but the kind of investment, that is, its degree of relation specificity. In this
situation, a trade-off appears. On the one hand, highly specific investment yields a greater
surplus to be divided between the partners but, on the other hand, it reduces the ex post
bargaining position of the investor, provided his partner has chosen a less specific type of
investment. This is due to the fact that the former has a lower outside option than the
latter in the negotiation stage. In other words, the particular pair of investments decided
by the players determines their outside options and therefore, their ex post bargaining
position (“the fundamental transformation” (Williamson (1985)). When the parties face
this strategic situation a strong coordination problem would arise caused by a multiplicity
of equilibria where both the efficient and the inefficient allocation are Nash equilibrium
outcomes. Notice that in the previous literature on incomplete contracts and specific
investments the first best cannot be achieved, whereas in our model the first best is a
Nash equilibrium, but under plausible conditions it is so risky that the parties will choose
the inefficient but the less risky strategy of making general investments. This
coordination failure is caused by the fear of getting locked in the relationship with a very
weak bargaining position and being exploited by the other party in the negotiation stage.
2. The model
We consider the relationship between a player 1 and a player 2 who wish to trade
some good. In a first stage, each player has to decide separately and simultaneously
whether to make a specific investment (S) or a general investment (G). The pair of
investments decided by the players determines the size of the joint surplus, which has to
be divided between them at a second stage. In this stage, they negotiate following an
alternating-offer game in which the identity of the first proposer is determined by a fair
lottery and both players can take their outside options at any time. That is, a player can
take his outside option after any rejection even if he has been the proposer. For
simplicity, we will assume that players share the same discount factor in this negotiation,
d ˛ ( 2
1 ,1).2
We will assume that specific investment entails a higher individual cost than
general investment. In particular, let c > 0 be the cost of specific investment and we
normalize the cost of general investment to zero.
On the other hand, specific investment is more efficient. If both players make
specific investments the highest surplus  v  is obtained. If one of them makes a specific
investment and the other makes a general investment then they get a smaller but positive
surplus v. And finally, if both players make a general investment they get the lowest
possible surplus, which we normalise to zero. We will assume v > v > c > 0.
             Each particular pair of investments determines also the bargaining power of the
players at the second stage, when the players have to negotiate the division of the surplus.
The reason is very intuitive: when a player makes a general investment, this kind of
investment will be valuable outside the relationship, that is, he can trade with other
potential partner. In other words, the player has an outside option  d . We will assume v >
d > d v . Therefore, a player cannot obtain outside the negotiation a higher surplus than
the one obtained inside because, at best, his potential partner will make a specific
investment but, at worst, his potential partner will make a general investment.
              On the other hand, if a player makes a specific investment, he will be locked in
the relationship because this kind of investment is not valuable outside. For simplicity,
we assume that he has not outside option.
              To make the analysis interesting, we shall assume that having both individuals
make specific investments is the efficient allocation and hence:
       
d c v 2 2 > -                    (A.1)
3. Analysis and results
Let us solve the game described by backward induction. In the second stage, after
observing the realized surplus and the possible outside options, players negotiate the
division of the surplus following the already described alternating offers negotiation.
Firstly, we find the perfect equilibrium of the four possible subgames which results from
the four possible pair of investments.
Subgame 1: both players make specific investments.
In this case, the highest surplus v  is obtained and both players have no outside
option, that is, neither player 1 nor player 2 can trade with a third party. In other words,
they are locked into each other. As it is well-known the unique perfect equilibrium of this
game yields an immediate agreement on the Rubinstein’s partition: ( ) 1 ( d + v ,
) 1 ( d d + v ). As the identity of the first proposer is decided by a fair lottery, the expected
equilibrium payoff for any player would be:
         2
1 ( ) 1 ( d + v ) +  2
1 ( ) 1 ( d d + v )  =  v 2
1 .3
Subgame 2: player i makes a specific investment and player j makes a general
investment, where i, j ˛ ￿1,2￿.
In this case, the realized surplus is  v and only player j has a positive outside
option  d because his investment is valuable outside, whereas player i is locked in the
relationship.
Firstly, suppose player i gets to be the first proposer. As player j can take his
outside option as a responder, player i will offer the following division of the surplus: ( v
- d ,  d ). Notice that  ) 1 ( d d d + > > v v d .Therefore, the division of the surplus is
accepted in equilibrium because of the  Outside Option Principle (Sutton (1986)).
Secondly, assume that player j gets to be the first proposer and now he can take his
outside option after his offer has been rejected. In this case, player j has a substantially
stronger bargaining position. Now, he can claim a proportion of the surplus greater than
his outside option making a take-it or leave-it offer. In particular, player j will propose the
following division of the surplus: ( 0, v ). Notice that it is a credible threat that player j
leaves the game if this division is rejected by player i because player j’s outside option is
greater than the size of the surplus in the following period. Therefore, the equilibrium
expected payoff is  ) ( 2
1 d v - for player i and  ) ( 2
1 d v + for player j. Observe, that player j
gets more than a half of the surplus in the equilibrium partition. This is a consequence of
his stronger bargaining position. Notice, that if his outside option d approaches to v, then
player j gets almost the whole surplus in the equilibrium partition.
 
Subgame 3: both players make general investments.
In this case, given that the expected surplus is zero, taking the outside options is
the best reply for both players and therefore, trade will not take place. Consequently, the
equilibrium payoff for any player is given by  d .
Summarizing, if both players make specific investments, neither of them has any
outside option and they obtain half of the high surplus in the negotiation stage. If one
player makes a specific investment and his partner makes a general investment, the latter
has an outside option which allows him to claim more than one-half of the low surplus in
the negotiation stage. Lastly, if both players make a general investment, they take their
outside options and trade will not occur.
The investments game.
  Let us now analyse the investment stage. Recall, that each player has to decide
separately and simultaneously whether to make a specific investment (S) or a general
investment (G). Given the negotiation results obtained previously and the backward4
induction hypotheses, players will face the following simultaneous game in the first
period:
      (M.1)
                    S                          G
   S       c v - 2
1      ,    c v - 2
1       c d v - - ) ( 2
1     ,    ) ( 2
1 d v +
   G       ) ( 2
1 d v +   ,   c d v - - ) ( 2
1               d           ,          d
where player 1 is the row-player and player 2 is the column-player.
Notice that from assumption (A.1) it follows that:  c v - 2
1  > d . That is, (S,S)
payoff-dominates (G,G), where the first term in parentheses is the investment chosen by
player 1 and the second term is the investment chosen by player 2. On the other hand,
given that d ˛ ( 1 , 2
1 ) and d  > d v , then d >  c d v - - ) ( 2
1 . That is, to make a general
investment is the best reply to a general investment of the partner. In other words, (G,G)
is always a Nash equilibrium of the game.
In order to concentrate in the more interesting case, we will assume that (S,S) is
also a Nash equilibrium of the investment game (M.1). That is, (M.1) is not a prisoner’s
dilemma game but a coordination game
1. Namely, the following condition holds:
       c v - 2
1  >  ) ( 2
1 d v +                            (C)
Denote by E the gains of efficiency, i.e., E =  ) 2 2 ( d c v + - . Thus, condition (C)
can be written as  E >  ) ( d v -  > 0.
 If players could coordinate their actions by means of a binding contract, they
would obviously make specific investments obtaining their best payoffs. But recall that
this is impossible because of the incomplete contracting environment. Nevertheless,
although (S,S) is the Pareto dominant equilibrium, to play S can be riskier than to play G.
If player 1 chooses S and player 2 chooses S, player 1 gets his best payoff but, if player 2
chooses G, player 1 obtains his worst payoff. On the contrary, by making a general
investment, although player 2 makes a general investment, player 1 gets, at least, his
outside option. Similarly, the same holds for player 2. This notion of “strategic risk” is
captured by the concept of risk dominant equilibrium of Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
Experimental evidence (see, for example, Fatas, Olcina and Peñarrubia (2001)) and
results obtained from evolutionary game theory (see, for example, Kandori, Mailath and
Rob (1993)) predicts that, in case of conflict between risk dominance and Pareto
efficiency, players tend to coordinate in the risk dominant but inefficient equilibrium.
In order to make a formal analysis of the game (M.1) we use the  Incentive
Dominance notion of Olcina (1997) and Olcina and Urbano (1994), which is equivalent
in 2x2 games to the Risk Dominance notion of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Formally, a
strategy of a player is incentive dominant in a 2x2 game if the set of beliefs over the
                                                
1 Obviously, if (M.1) has the structure of a prisoner’s dilemma to make a general investment is a
dominant strategy for both players and, therefore, (G,G) is the unique Nash equilibrium.5
strategies of his opponent for which this stategy is a best reply has the largest Lebesgue
measure.
Proposition 1. Assume condition (C) holds in game (M.1), if the efficiency gains E are
smaller than a critical value,  v 2
1 , then (G,G) is the risk dominant equilibrium.
Proof. Denote by  p the probability that player i assigns to player j making a specific
investment, then if player i makes a specific investment, his expected payoff will be:
         p( c v - 2
1 ) + (1-p)( c d v - - 2
1
2
1 )          (1)
On the contrary, if he makes a general investment, his expected payoff is given
by:
                p( d v 2
1
2
1 + ) + (1-p)d                                                      (2)
Hence, to make a general investment is better than to make a specific investment
for any p such that:











                       (3)
Therefore, to make a general investment is the incentive dominant strategy if
2
1 ˆ > p , that is:














          (4)
            This condition can be rewritten as:
  v 2
1 > E                     (5)
            n
Therefore, even if there are sufficient gains of efficiency to sustain (S,S) as an
equilibrium, if they are smaller than a critical value  v 2
1 , that is, they are not large
enough, players will coordinate in the risk dominant, but inefficient, equilibrium. This
coordination failure would be caused by the fear of getting trapped in the relationship or,
in other words, to be in the hands of the opponent and be exploited by him in the
bargaining stage. Only if the gains of efficiency are very large, players will take the
strategic risk of making specific investments.6
4.  Conclusions
In this note we have shown that when the differences between player in the
degree of specificity of their investments determines their ex post bargaining position,
this would result in a multiplicity of equilibria which might yield a coordination failure.
In particular, the first best is an equilibrium result in our model but under plausible
conditions it is so risky that the parties will choose the safe strategy of making general
investments.
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